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TROPES AS DIVINE ACTS: 
THE NATURE OF CREATURELY PROPERTIES 
IN A WORLD SUSTAINED BY GOD1
ROBERT K. GARCIA
Texas A&M University
Abstract. I aim to synthesize two issues within theistic metaphysics. The first 
concerns the metaphysics of creaturely properties and, more specifically, the 
nature of unshareable properties, or tropes. The second concerns the metaphysics 
of providence and, more specifically, the way in which God sustains creatures, 
or sustenance. I propose that creaturely properties, understood as what I call 
modifier tropes, are identical with divine acts of sustenance, understood as acts 
of property-conferral. I argue that this theistic conferralism is attractive because 
it integrates trope theory and the doctrine of sustenance in a mutually enhancing 
way. Taking modifier tropes to be divine acts mitigates certain weaknesses of 
trope theory and safeguards divine sustenance from the threat of both deism 
and occasionalism.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this article I aim to synthesize two issues within theistic metaphysics. 
The first concerns the metaphysics of creaturely properties and, more 
specifically, the nature of unshareable properties, or tropes. The second 
concerns the metaphysics of divine providence and, more specifically, the 
way in which God continually sustains creatures, or divine sustenance. 
My aim is to bring these issues into closer contact by explaining and 
motivating the proposal that creaturely properties are identical with 
1 I dedicate this article to the memory of my friend Scott Austin, who acted divinely 
if anyone ever did.
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divine actions. Ultimately, I will arrive at a more nuanced version of the 
following thesis:
Theistic Conferralism (provisional statement): Divine sustenance 
involves basic and unmediated acts whereby God supplies creatures 
with their properties. As such, there is no distinction between the 
supplying of a  property and the property supplied. In fact, those 
actions are identical with the properties of creatures. And, with 
respect to a metaphysical theory of properties, those actions-cum-
properties are tropes.
Note that this thesis identifies creaturely properties with divine acts. It 
does not affirm (or deny) that divine properties are identical with divine 
acts. I will not directly discuss the latter identity claim here, though it 
merits consideration.2 At any rate, the restriction to creaturely properties 
will be suppressed in the sequel.
I will argue that, in its final form, theistic conferralism is attractive 
because it offers a mutually enhancing integration of a prominent theory 
of properties – trope theory – and a  crucial monotheistic doctrine – 
sustenance. Taking tropes to be divine acts mitigates certain weaknesses 
of trope theory and safeguards divine sustenance from the threat of both 
deism and occasionalism.
II. THE METAPHYSICS OF CREATURELY PROPERTIES
There are many theories about the existence and nature of properties. 
However, I take theistic conferralism to be viable only if it is understood 
in terms of the specific theory I have in mind, which I call modifier trope 
theory. The latter is often conflated with a nearby but fundamentally 
different view, what I  call module trope theory. As I  explain below, if 
theistic conferralism is (mis)understood in terms of module tropes, 
2 The claim may offer a way to understand or improve theistic activism. As originally 
developed by Morris and Menzel (1986), theistic activism has it that God creates the 
platonic realm of necessarily existing objects, including God’s own essence. I’m inclined 
to think that theistic activism is best understood (or improved) as identifying the divine 
nature with a basic divine action, rather than taking the divine nature to be in some sense 
created by a divine action. So understood, theistic activism would hold that God’s nature 
just is a self-naturing act. Thus, because a basic divine act is free but not itself created, 
a theistic activist could affirm that God freely natures himself, while denying that God 
creates his nature. For more on basic divine action see Alston (1994: 45). For recent 
discussion of theistic activism, see Menzel (Forthcoming) and the essays in Gould (2014).
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it will straightforwardly entail occasionalism. Thus, because avoiding 
occasionalism is one of the chief aims of the proposed view, it will be 
important to distinguish module tropes from modifier tropes and 
to understand theistic conferralism in terms of the latter. Something 
else that is important for understanding the view is the distinction 
between a property-role and the various types of candidate entities that 
philosophers have employed or postulated to play that role. To clarify 
these matters, I will begin by sketching out a hierarchy of views and 
choice points concerning the metaphysics of properties, eventually 
drilling down to modifier trope theory.
Among the many traditional and contemporary views concerning 
the existence and nature of properties, perhaps the highest level of 
disagreement concerns whether properties exist at all. The naysayers 
are called austere nominalists. On their view, strictly speaking, there are 
no characteristics but only primitively charactered objects; there are 
spherical objects – billiard balls and the like – but no sphericity per se.3 
Those opposed to austere nominalism agree that properties exist in some 
sense or another.
Generally, philosophers who think that properties exist think that 
properties are needed to do metaphysical work. This is sometimes 
expressed by saying that there are one or more property roles that need to 
be played.4 Thus, as Alex Oliver puts it, each of the competing property 
theories can be seen as positing a system of candidate entities that are 
supposed to be the best qualified to play whatever property roles need to 
be played (1996, 11). There are several putative property roles, but here 
I will focus on the traditional idea that a property is a character-grounder 
and plays what we might call the character-grounding role. Properties 
ground character in that an object is variously charactered in virtue of 
having the specific properties that it does. For example, the sphericity 
of a ball grounds its shape; the ball is shaped as it is in virtue of being 
related to sphericity in the right way.
3 As I understand it, austere nominalism entails but is not equivalent to so-called 
ostrich nominalism. Roughly, the latter denies that properties are required to account for 
predication, whereas austere nominalism denies that properties are required to account 
for anything. For more on austere nominalism, see Loux (2006), Garcia (2009), and 
Carroll and Markosian (2010). For ostrich nominalism, see the excellent discussion in 
Imaguire (2014).
4  For helpful discussion about various putative property roles, see Oliver (1996), 
Swoyer (1999), and Edwards (2014).
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Those who agree that properties exist disagree over what properties 
are like – over the kind of entity that plays the character-grounding role. 
Indeed, philosophers have employed a wild variety of entities to play this 
role. Here, the most general disagreement concerns whether properties 
are constructed out of more fundamental entities. Among philosophers 
who take properties to be constructed, for example, some identify 
properties with sets of (actual or possible) ordinary objects. On the latter 
view, generally speaking, an object is charactered in some way in virtue 
of being a member of a certain set of objects; here, the set plays the role 
of a character-grounder and, thus, the set is a property.
Among those who posit unconstructed, fundamental properties, 
a major point of disagreement concerns whether or not properties are 
shareable (multiply-instantiable, repeatable, etc.). A property is shareable 
if and only if it can characterize multiple wholly distinct objects at once. 
A  realist takes (non-haecceitistic) properties to be shareable and calls 
them universals. On realism, it is possible that two distinct spheres a and 
b exist simultaneously, such that the sphericity of a  is (numerically) 
identical with the sphericity of b; the sphericity is a universal.5 In contrast, 
a  trope theorist takes properties to be non-shareable and calls them 
tropes. On their view, if distinct spheres a and b exist simultaneously, 
then the sphericity of a and the sphericity of b are exactly similar but 
numerically distinct; the sphericities are tropes.6
We have almost drilled down to modifier trope theory. Discerning 
this theory is somewhat impeded by the fact that the literature tends 
to conflate the view with a  nearby but fundamentally different trope 
theory, what I  call module trope theory.7 The difference turns on 
a distinction between two competing concepts of a trope. To illustrate 
the distinction, suppose there is a billiard ball that has a sphericity trope, 
what a trope theorist might describe as “an instance of sphericity” or “the 
sphericalness of the ball”. Now consider: Is the trope itself spherical? If 
you think the answer is yes, that a sphericity trope is itself spherical, then 
you are thinking of what I call a module trope. If you think the answer is 
5 Important contemporary defenses of realism include Armstrong (1989) and (1997), 
and Moreland (2001) and (2013).
6 Important defenses of trope theory include Stout (1921) and (1923) and Williams 
(1953), and, more recently, Campbell (1981) and (1990), Maurin (2002), and Ehring 
(2011).
7 I am indebted to Michael Loux for first alerting me to this distinction. I say more 
about my indebtedness in Garcia (2015), where I discuss the distinction at length.
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no, that a sphericity trope is not itself spherical, then you are thinking of 
what I call a modifier trope. Roughly, the module/modifier distinction 
turns on whether tropes are self-exemplifying (module tropes) or non-
self-exemplifying (modifier tropes).
As before, it is crucial to understand theistic conferralism in terms 
of modifier tropes and not module tropes. Thus, to forestall potential 
misunderstanding, it will be useful to say a bit more about each concept 
of a trope. On the one hand, a module trope is a character-grounder that 
is self-exemplifying and non-shareable. However, self-exemplification 
should not be taken to imply that a  module trope somehow has its 
intrinsic character derivatively. Rather, a  module trope is primitively 
charactered with respect to the character it self-exemplifies: a sphericity 
module trope is primitively spherical. Moreover, a  module trope is 
primitively maximally thinly charactered: a  sphericity module trope 
is primitively spherical and not (to the extent possible8) otherwise 
intrinsically charactered. Thus, in effect, a module trope is a primitively 
singly-propertied object.9 A  sphericity module trope is a  primitively 
merely-spherical object. This concept of a trope often shows up – usually 
only tacitly – within a trope bundle theory, such as those defended by 
D. C. Williams (1953), Keith Campbell (1990), and, perhaps10, Anna-
Sofia Maurin (2002), and Douglas Ehring (2011). This is no accident 
arguably, module tropes are better suited for a bundle theory of substance 
than are modifier tropes.11
On the other hand, a modifier trope is a character-grounder that is 
non-self-exemplifying and non-shareable. It does not exemplify, have, 
or bear the character it grounds. Rather, a modifier trope grounds the 
8 In Garcia (Forthcoming) I argue that there are problems lurking here for module 
tropes.
9  Although module trope theorists often categorize tropes as properties, I  think 
module tropes are best thought of as belonging to the category of object. In contrast, 
modifier tropes are accurately thought of as being properties in the traditional sense 
of being “predicable” entities. For this reason, modifier tropes tend to be employed 
within a  substance-attribute model. For example, some philosophers – such as Lowe 
(2006) – sharply distinguish objects and modes of objects while identifying modes with 
tropes. I take such a view to be identifying modes with modifier tropes. Arguably, the 
latter identification is incompatible with a module trope theory. I thank Ross Inman for 
pressing me to clarify this.
10  I  say “perhaps” because it is less than clear to me that Maurin and Ehring are 
working with the concept of a module trope.
11 I discuss this in my (2015) and “Tropes as Character-Grounders”.
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character of its bearer; a modifier trope is, as it were, a character-maker 
or characterizer. On modifier trope theory, a sphericity trope is not itself 
spherical. Rather, the trope makes its bearer spherical. A  sphericity 
modifier trope is a  non-shareable, non-spherical, sphere-maker or 
spherizer. This concept of a trope is often tacitly at play within substance-
attribute ontologies such as that of C. B. Martin (1980) and E. J. Lowe 
(2006).12
To sum up, we may say that a modifier trope is a singly-characterizing 
property, whereas a module trope is a primitively- and singly-charactered 
object. Both concepts of a trope have currency in the literature, and each 
has unique strengths and weaknesses.13
There are several reasons why theistic conferralism should be 
understood in terms of modifier tropes and not module tropes. First, 
taking creaturely properties to be module tropes that are identical with 
divine actions would entail that divine actions are (or are among) the 
basic objects of the world. This is not only implausible – on the grounds 
that no action is itself, say, spherical – but it would also seem to amount 
to a version of panentheism.14 This would be an unwelcome result, not 
least because the proposed view aspires to improve a theistic doctrine of 
sustenance.
Second, for similar reasons, understanding theistic conferralism in 
terms of module tropes would imply that natural causes are identical 
with divine actions – in other words, it would amount to a version of 
occasionalism. Many trope theorists hold that tropes are the immediate 
objects of perception and the terms of causal relations.15 With respect 
to perception, trope theorists have argued that one immediately sees 
the redness of a rose. And, regarding causation, they have argued that 
the hotness of the stove is the direct cause of the burn on your hand 
(Maurin 2013). Arguably, however, these claims are predicated on the 
(tacit) assumption that tropes are module tropes.16 For example, it 
12 It is not easy to tell which concept of a trope is the intended one in Lowe’s work. In 
conversation, however, Lowe clarified that he takes tropes to be modifier tropes.
13 See my (2015) and (Forthcoming).
14 Roughly, panentheism is the view that God is in the world and the world is in God 
but God is not identical with the world. Panentheists cash out their view in different 
ways. For recent discussion, see especially Clayton and Peacocke (2004).
15 See Campbell (1990), Ehring (2011), Maurin (2013), Schaffer (2001), and Williams 
(1953).
16 I argue for this in my (Forthcoming).
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is precisely because a redness module trope is itself red that the trope 
can be immediately perceived when I look at a rose. And, it is precisely 
because a hotness module trope is itself temperatured that a hotness 
trope can directly cause a burn when I touch a hot stove. In other words, 
module tropes can play a direct role in causation and perception because 
they are thinly-charactered objects. Thus, if understood in terms of 
module tropes, theistic conferralism says that divine actions are identical 
with thinly-charactered objects that play a direct role in causation and 
perception – that divine acts are natural causes and percepts. In this way, 
on module trope theory the proposed view would entail occasionalism.
Crucially, this is not the case on modifier trope theory. A  redness 
modifier trope is not colored and a  hotness modifier trope is not 
temperatured. As such, modifier tropes are not eligible to play a direct 
role in causation and perception. More generally, as character-grounders, 
modifier tropes act as formal causes rather than as efficient causes. Thus, 
identifying divine actions with modifier tropes does not entail that those 
acts are efficient causes, and so does not entail occasionalism.
A  third reason stems from conclusions that are upstream of this 
project. For reasons given elsewhere, I take modifier tropes to be superior 
to module tropes.17 As I will explain in section seven, however, several 
weaknesses of modifier trope theory can be mitigated by conjoining the 
theory with theistic conferralism.
Fourth and finally, on a plausible understanding of it, the monotheistic 
doctrine of sustenance seems to tacitly involve a commitment to modifier 
tropes. I hope to substantiate this claim in the next two sections.
III. SUSTENANCE
In Western monotheism a perennial philosophical issue concerns the 
nature of providence. There are several aspects of providence, but the 
dimension of interest here is that of sustenance. The scriptures and creeds 
of the monotheisms of the Abrahamic tradition routinely give voice to the 
idea that creatures are profoundly and continually dependent on God.18 
This idea is so important as to be called the doctrine of sustenance, which 
17  I offer reasons in my (2015), (Forthcoming), and “Tropes as Character-Grounders”.
18 The doctrine is said to find expression in many sacred texts, including Wisdom 
11:25; Psalm 36:5-6; Acts 17:28; Romans 11:36; Hebrews 1:2-3; Colossians 1:16-17; and 
Qur-án 13:2-3 and 59:24. The doctrine is affirmed in creeds such as the 1530 Augsburg 
Confession (God is said to be the “creator and preserver of all things visible and invisible”) 
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we may summarize as the thesis that all created entities whatsoever are 
dependent on God’s sustaining them in being from moment to moment.19
To understand theistic conferralism, we need to draw a distinction 
within sustenance itself. The distinction stems from a contrast between 
a narrow and a broad sense of sustenance. Kathryn Tanner draws the 
contrast as follows:
In a narrow sense God is the creator as the giver of existence, where the 
fact of being is contrasted with what one is or does or becomes. But in 
a broader sense, God acts in the mode of creator whatever the aspect of 
created existence at issue ... [In the broad sense, from] the most general 
to the most specific features of existence, all that the creature is it owes to 
God as the creator of the world. (1994: 112-113).
In other words, in the narrow sense, sustenance only involves God’s 
continually upholding creatures in existence, or supplying them with 
existence. Hugh McCann calls this existence-conferral (2012, 30). In 
the broad sense, sustenance also involves God’s continually supplying 
creatures with their properties and powers. That is, it involves the 
continuous dependence of all creatures on God for their properties and 
powers. I will call this dimension of broad sustenance property-conferral. 
In this sense, creaturely properties are conferred properties – hence the 
name, “theistic conferralism”.20
The broad sense of sustenance finds expression in the work of various 
theologians and philosophers. For example, Louis Berkhof says that 
sustenance is “that continuous work of God by which He maintains the 
things which He created, together with the properties and powers with 
which He endowed them” (1996, 170). Similarly, Richard Swinburne 
says that “God is our supreme benefactor: we owe our existence from 
moment to moment, and our powers and pleasures, our knowledge and 
desires, to his sustaining power” (1998, 112). Thus, for Berkhof and 
Swinburne, sustenance is twofold and involves not only God’s continually 
upholding things in existence (existence-conferral) but also God’s 
continually supplying things with their properties (property-conferral). 
and the 1646 Westminster Confession of Faith (“God ... doth uphold, direct, dispose, and 
govern all creatures, actions, and things ...”).
19 This summary is adapted from Rogers (2010: 99). Sustenance is sometimes called 
preservation. For a helpful general discussion see Kvanvig (2008).
20 See Ásta Sveinsdóttir (2008) and (2013) for an excellent discussion of conferred 
properties. I  take it that, in Sveinsdóttir’s terms, theistic conferralism is a conferralist 
account of (creaturely) properties.
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Similar avowals of broad sustenance are not hard to find throughout the 
monotheistic tradition.21
Property-conferral seems to be at the root of one of the traditional 
challenges for an account of providence. The challenge I have in mind 
is that of avoiding both deism and occasionalism. As Farley notes, in 
the orthodox tradition, “God’s governance can neither be reduced to 
‘bare permission’ [deism] nor identified with the natural order alone 
[occasionalism]” (1988, 173). Some philosophers reject property-
conferral, apparently on the grounds that property-conferral leads to 
occasionalism by making God the immediate cause of a creature’s having 
its properties.22 Others affirm property-conferral, apparently on the 
grounds that rejecting it leads to deism by taking God out of immediate 
contact with the world.23 Thus, it seems that property-conferral poses 
a dilemma: the rejection of it threatens to give rise to deism and the 
affirmation of it threatens to give rise to occasionalism. My principle aim 
in this paper is to take a closer look at property-conferral and to propose 
a way of understanding it in terms of modifier tropes. My hope is that 
understanding property-conferral in this way will resolve the above 
dilemma and, moreover, shore up weaknesses of modifier trope theory.
IV. THE PALETTE THEORY
The foregoing has primarily been stage setting: First, I have introduced 
trope theory and distinguished between modifier tropes and module 
tropes. Second, I  have introduced the doctrine of sustenance and 
marked out the aspect of sustenance that I call property-conferral. I will 
now focus on the following questions: Metaphysically speaking, what 
does property-conferral amount to? And, in particular, does God create 
properties prior to distributing them to objects?
In the next section, I will argue against a  natural and affirmative 
answer to the second question. In descriptions of broad sustenance, 
such as those noted above, the language often suggests that in property-
conferral there is a  distinction between an  act of conferring and the 
property that is conferred. More specifically, it suggests that God creates 
a property prior to bestowing it on an object, where the priority here 
21 See, for example, Berkouwer (1952) and van Inwagen (1988).
22 E.g., Thomas Tracy (1994: 89).
23 E.g., Kathryn Tanner (1994) and Hugh McCann (2012).
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need not be temporal. I will call this the palette theory because it suggests 
that the way that God confers properties on objects is analogous to the 
way that a Renaissance artist paints a canvas: by first making the paint 
and then applying it to a canvas. On this analogy, God paints objects 
with antecedently created properties.24 Or, dropping the analogy, God 
characterizes objects with antecedently created characteristics. For 
example, in sustaining the character of a ripe tomato, God has created 
redness and bestowed or conferred it on the tomato.
The palette theory offers a  natural way to understand property-
conferral. However, I  think that there are reasons to reject the palette 
theory and that those reasons support theistic conferralism. In the next 
section I will offer reasons to reject the palette theory. In the subsequent 
section I will explore the implications of rejecting it.
V. AGAINST THE PALETTE THEORY
I will present three problems for the palette theory. As we will see, the 
case against the palette theory is also a case for theistic conferralism.
The Immediacy Challenge
First, the palette theory violates an immediacy criterion for sustenance. 
According to Charles McCracken, a  traditional aim of a  doctrine of 
sustenance is to secure or recognize “the total and immediate dependence 
of all things on God.”25 Others, such as Philip Quinn (1988, 87, 98) and 
Kathryn Tanner (1988, 84), take it to be a  criterion for an  acceptable 
doctrine of sustenance that sustenance be characterized by immediacy 
and the absence of instruments. According to Tanner, “God’s agency must 
be talked about as universal and immediate,  ... conversely, everything 
non-divine must be talked about as existing in a  relation of total and 
immediate dependence upon God” (1988, 84). As Tracy puts it, on this 
view “there is no instrumental substructure in God’s creative activity, 
God does not do one thing by doing another” (1994, 84).
On the palette theory, properties are God’s tools for character-
grounding. Mediating between God and an object is a distinct entity: 
a property that serves as a created instrument for God’s sustaining that 
24 This analogy is not perfect, as the artist case involves temporal priority whereas the 
palette theory does not.
25 Cited in Quinn (1988: 98).
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object. For example, between God and a billiard ball, there is sphericity, 
a created property by which God sustains the ball. More generally, on the 
palette theory, one category of created entities – the properties – is used 
by God to sustain another category of created entities – the objects. Thus, 
if palette theory is true, then property-conferral is a mediated divine 
activity. In this way, the palette theory violates the immediacy criterion.26
The Regress Challenge
Second, the palette theory either leads to a problematic regress or requires 
a self-undermining restriction. As we will see, the regress can be stopped 
by a natural and plausible restriction on the palette theory, but the theory 
is undermined by the very fact that this restriction is plausible.
As a warm up for the regress problem, suppose there is a peculiar 
craftsman – let us call him Guido – whose peculiarity stems from two 
facts about him. First, Guido cannot make anything without using his 
tools. And second, Guido must make all his tools. I submit that Guido 
would be hard pressed to make anything. Or, perhaps he could make 
something only if he made an infinite number of things. As we will see, 
on the palette theory, God and Guido are in similar situations.
The palette theory accepts the broad conception of sustenance: it takes 
sustenance to involve property-conferral and the continuous dependence 
of all creatures on God for their properties and powers. What makes the 
palette theory unique is that it takes property-conferral to involve the 
creation and bestowal of a property. Here, a creature is dependent on 
God’s supplying a property that God has created. On this picture, God 
creates a  character-grounder with which he grounds the character of 
an object by giving the character-grounder to the object. That is, for any 
creature x, God sustains x, in part, by creating properties and bestowing 
them on x. For example, God creates sphericity in order to ground the 
shape of a sphere; in being shaped as it is, the sphere depends on God’s 
(logically) prior creation and bestowal of sphericity.
Unfortunately, this threatens the palette theory with a vicious regress. 
According to the palette theory, for any creature c, c depends on God’s 
sustaining activity, where this involves God’s creating c’s properties and 
bestowing them on c. But because c’s properties are created, they also 
26  I  follow Quinn (1988) in taking immediacy to be a  criterion and not merely 
a  desideratum for a  theory of sustenance. However, even if immediacy is only 
a desideratum, violating immediacy is still a pro tanto disadvantage of the palette theory.
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depend on God’s sustaining activity. Thus, where F is one of c’s properties, 
God sustains F by creating F’s properties and bestowing them on F. Thus, 
to sustain a first-order property (F), the palette theory has God creating 
second-order properties (the properties of F). An example of a first-order 
property is the familiar property sphericity, whereas a  second-order 
property would be a property of sphericity itself, such as being a shape. 
On the palette theory, to sustain the first-order property sphericity, God 
must create and bestow all of sphericity’s second-order properties – such 
as such as being a shape, being non-shareable, being a sphericity property, 
and so on. In being the kind of property it is, sphericity depends on 
God’s prior creation and bestowal of these second-order properties. But 
because each second-order property is created, it also is dependent on 
divine sustenance, generating an  unattractive and seemingly vicious 
dependence regress of property-conferral.
An  obvious and plausible way to avoid the regress is to restrict 
the palette theory to exclude properties from its scope. Call this the 
restricted palette theory. Here, God creates and sustains properties 
but the property-conferral involved in sustaining properties does not 
involve God’s creating second-order properties which God then bestows 
on the first-order properties. Instead, with respect to sustaining created 
properties, property-conferral is immediate and amounts to unmediated 
character-grounding. In other words, God acts so as to ground directly 
the character of first-order properties without a separate and prior act 
of creating their second-order properties. On the restricted theory, 
God’s unmediated characterizing action is itself the character-grounder 
for a property and there is no distinction between the act of conferring 
and the property conferred. For example, in sustaining a billiard ball, 
God creates, confers, and sustains sphericity, but God does not sustain 
sphericity by first creating a rather rococo second-order property called 
“being a  sphericity property” and bestowing it on sphericity. Instead, 
with respect to sphericity, property-conferral is immediate: God directly 
grounds the character of sphericity. Thus, whereas sphericity directly 
grounds the character of the ball by spherizing the ball, God directly 
grounds the character of sphericity by sphericity-izing sphericity.
To be sure, there are independent reasons for denying that there are 
second-order properties. For example, one might take second-order 
predications like “being a sphericity property” to be made true by the 
(first-order) property itself (i.e., by sphericity). This provides a  further 
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reason to restrict the palette theory.27 However, as we will now see, the 
upshot of this restriction is the same.
The restricted palette theory stops the regress of property-conferral, 
but it does so by allowing that for some created entities – namely, (first-
order) properties – property-conferral is immediate and does not involve 
the prior creation and bestowal of (second-order) properties. However, 
if the regress can be stopped by immediate property-conferral for some 
category of created being, why not stop it at the object-level rather than 
at the property-level? Presumably, if the strategy works at the property-
level, then it would also work at the object-level. But deploying it at the 
object-level would do away with all non-immediate property-conferral, 
thus making it unnecessary for God to create any properties at all. Thus, 
the restricted palette theory requires a move that makes it unnecessary 
for God to create first-order properties in the first place. In this way, 
the restricted palette theory undermines the rationale for the original 
palette theory.
To sum up, the palette theory involves either a problematic regress 
or a  self-undermining restriction. More generally, the problems with 
the palette theory suggest that property-conferral need not involve the 
creation of properties. Moreover, it suggests that all property-conferral is 
immediate and amounts to unmediated character-grounding, whereby 
God plays the character-grounding role by acting to ground directly 
the character of objects, without a  separate and prior act of creating 
their properties. For example, there is no need for God to sphericity-ize 
sphericity, which in turn spherizes the ball. Instead, God can directly 
spherize the ball.
The Precognition Challenge
The palette theory faces a  third and final challenge. Here the problem 
stems from a  plausible principle concerning divine precognition. 
According to many prominent voices in the tradition, God’s knowledge 
of creation, in some sense, precedes God’s free creative activity. That is, 
in some sense, God precognizes what he freely creates. Here I want to 
focus on what we might call qualitative precognition, the principle that 
God foreknows all the kinds of things God could make. I will put the idea 
as follows:
27 I thank John Heil for drawing this to my attention.
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Precognition: Prior to creating anything whatsoever, for any x that 
God could create, God foreknows everything about the kind of 
thing x would be, everything about the nature x would have, and, 
in particular, God foreknows all the kinds of things that x would be 
essentially capable of doing.
Two brief but important caveats about this principle are in order. 
First, the type of priority in precognition need not be temporal. That 
is, however we understand Precognition, it should be consistent with 
different views about God and time and whether or not creation has 
always (albeit contingently) existed. Second, I intend for Precognition to 
be neutral on whether and to what extent God foreknows what creatures 
would freely do.
I  take Precognition to enjoy a  high degree of plausibility, largely 
stemming from a consideration of how things look if we deny it. In his 
recent book, Ontology and Providence in Creation: Taking Creation Ex 
Nihilo Seriously, Mark Ian Thomas Robson develops a view of providence 
predicated on the denial of Precognition. In short, Robson argues that if 
God has precognition then what God creates is a mere replica of what 
God precognizes, and this, in turn, violates the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo. Indeed, to imagine that God has precognition is to think of “God 
as the great photocopier” (2008, 50). Thus, to preserve creation ex nihilo, 
we must deny that God has prior qualitative knowledge of what his free 
creative acts could produce. Strictly speaking, God lacks foreknowledge 
about the kinds of things God could create prior to God’s free creative 
act. Robson aptly calls this radical creation ex nihilo.
Unfortunately, and with all due respect to Robson, what he takes to 
be radical, I take to be a compelling and vivid reductio on the denial of 
Precognition. To show why, perhaps it will suffice to consider a passage 
from Timothy Pawl’s review of Robson’s book. As Pawl imagines it, if 
Robson is right, God found himself in the following situation:
God is confronted with a large (perhaps infinite) number of levers (i.e., 
continua or capacities), each of which, in some sense, is a part of God. 
Each lever has a large (perhaps infinite) number of possible positions (i.e., 
actualizations of that capacity), and, for any position, if the lever is put to 
that position, it will produce something or other. God, however, does not 
know which lever does what. In fact, he doesn’t even have a list of things 
the levers could do. It isn’t that he knows that one produces colors and 
another elephants; he doesn’t even know of colors or elephants. The only 
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way he learns which lever does what and which position on each lever 
does what is by trial and, if not error, at least observation. Then, after 
pulling levers, he can tell what each lever is for, and what general sort of 
thing it creates. In creating, God pulls lots of levers (2009).
In other words, on Robson’s view, God literally discovers what he is capable 
of. On this picture, prior to creation, God is omnipotent yet maximally 
ignorant of what his creative power can do. In effect, this represents God 
as the greatest conceivable savant28 – by my lights, a more dubious deity 
than the photocopier God.
Moreover, I am not convinced that we are forced to choose between 
the photocopier God and the savant God. This is because I think there 
are grounds to reject an  apparent assumption of Robson’s argument. 
I have in mind the assumption that God has precognition only if what 
God creates is a  mere replica of what he precognizes. This seems to be 
based on the idea that precognition would require not only divine ideas 
but divine ideas understood as self-exemplifying forms – as archetypes 
or paradigms. However, even if precognition requires divine ideas, it is 
neither obvious nor plausible that those ideas must be archetypal. Indeed, 
whatever case can be made for archetypal divine ideas, I would sooner 
reject some premise in that case than accept the maximally savantic God.
To be sure, Precognition naturally suggests some form of divine 
conceptualism – roughly, the idea that God’s eternal knowledge in some 
way involves rich ideational content. I have a  few things to say about 
this below, but for the purposes of this paper I do not need to settle 
the question of which version of conceptualism best complements or 
supports Precognition.29
Their logical independence notwithstanding, the plausibility of 
Precognition lends support to theistic conferralism. It does so by 
undermining the palette theory. To see why, suppose that God has 
qualitative precognition and, setting aside the above regress worries, 
suppose that the palette theory is true. And consider a token property 
of sphericity, which God has made. Given Precognition, prior to making 
28 The following OED gloss on ‘savant’ is the relevant one: “A person who displays 
an unusual (often exceptional) aptitude for one particular type of mental task or artistic 
activity despite having significant impairment in other areas of intellectual or social 
functioning ...” (“savant, n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, Web. 2 April 2015.)
29  I’m inclined to pair theistic conferralism with theistic conceptual realism, as 
developed by Greg Welty (2014).
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sphericity, God knew what sort of metaphysical work the property would 
be able to do, or, to say the same thing, what sort of property role the 
creature would be able to play. Generally speaking, sphericity’s job would 
be that of a formal cause, or character-grounder. More specifically, its job 
would be to ground, or be the formal cause of, the shape of a sphere. To 
use language I introduced above, the job of sphericity is to be a sphere-
maker or spherizer. Thus, creating sphericity would amount to making 
a  sphere-maker. And, given palette theory, God’s creating sphericity 
amounts to God’s making a sphere-maker in order to sustain the shape 
of a sphere.
But, presumably, if God essentially has the knowledge and power 
required to make a character-grounder – for example, to make a sphere-
maker, then God has what it takes to ground character directly, whereby 
his doing so plays the role of a formal cause, and thereby just is a formal 
cause, such as a sphere-making or spherizing. Thus, if God’s aim is to 
ground the sphericity of something, there would seem to be no point for 
God to make first a sphere-maker. In this way Precognition suggests that 
the palette theory saddles God’s creative activity with redundancy and 
unparsimoniousness. These vices provide a reason to reject the palette 
theory and affirm theistic conferralism, which removes them.
This line of argument suggests that God does not need to create 
properties in order to ground the character of creatures. Rather, given 
Precognition, God can directly ground the character of objects. In any 
given case, God’s act of doing so would itself be a character-grounding. 
In this way, God’s action would itself play the property-role and, thus, 
the divine act would be a property.
VI. CONVERGING ON THEISTIC CONFERRALISM
This concludes the case against the palette theory. The immediacy, 
regress, and precognition challenges present serious difficulties for the 
thesis that God creates the properties he bestows – and, indeed, for any 
theory on which God creates character-grounders.30 Those challenges 
also converge on and support the following idea, which is an enhanced 
version of my original proposal:
30  Elsewhere I  hope to show how the regress and precognition challenges pose 
difficulties for the version of theistic activism proposed by Morris and Menzel (1986). 
But see my suggestion above, in footnote 2.
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Theistic Conferralism: Property-conferral does not involve the 
creation and bestowal of properties. Instead, a divine act of property-
conferral grounds the character of an object immediately, without the 
instrumentality of a property distinct from the act itself. Thus, the 
properties of creatures are identical with acts of divine sustenance, 
specifically, unmediated acts of property-conferral.
On this view, the actions-cum-properties that constitute property-
conferral turn out to be modifier tropes. Above I noted that a modifier 
trope is a non-shareable, non-self-exemplifying property, or character-
grounder. On theistic conferralism, the acts that constitute property-
conferral satisfy this description of a  modifier trope. First, if the 
proposed view is right, then an unmediated act of property-conferral 
itself plays the character-grounding role that a  traditional trope is 
supposed to play. But whatever can play a property-role is, by definition, 
a  property. Thus, because an  act of property-conferral can play the 
property role, it is a property qua character-grounder. In this sense, the 
properties of creatures are identical with divine actions. Second, acts of 
property-conferral are non-shareable. If an act grounds the sphericity of 
some object O, then God’s doing so – his spherizing-O – is an O-specific 
action. As such, the act is unshareable in that God’s spherizing-O could 
not possibly be an act of spherizing some creature distinct from O. Third, 
the act of grounding the sphericity of a ball is not itself spherical. Rather, 
the act is the formal cause of the ball’s being spherical. In this sense, 
acts of property-conferral are not self-exemplifying. Thus, the acts that 
constitute property-conferral are non-shareable, non-self-exemplifying 
properties. They are modifier tropes.
VII. IMPROVING MODIFIER TROPE THEORY
Previously, I  mentioned that theistic conferralism mitigates several 
weaknesses of modifier trope theory. We are now in a position to see 
how this is so.
The first weakness concerns unifying natural classes of tropes. Almost 
all trope theorists allow that there are (or could be) numerically distinct 
but exactly similar tropes.31 There might be, for example, many exactly 
31 Charles Hartshorne seems to have held to a trope theory on which no two tropes 
are exactly qualitatively alike; see Robson (2008: 55-56).
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similar but numerically distinct sphericity tropes. However, on pain of 
invoking a basic or irreducible universal, many (perhaps most) trope 
theorists deny that the unity of the natural class of sphericity tropes is to 
be explained in terms of a distinct property that is shared or instantiated 
by all and only sphericity tropes.
Instead, the standard view takes it to be primitive that a basic32 trope 
is the kind of trope it is.33 On this view, tropes belonging to a natural 
class are similar just in virtue of being the tropes that they are.34 That 
is, the unity of a natural class of tropes is grounded in the similarity 
of tropes, and the latter is determined by each trope primitively being 
what it is. Realists have alleged that accounting for the unity of a natural 
class of tropes in this way is unsatisfying and marks at least a pro tanto 
weakness of trope theory. A trope theorist may or may not agree, but if 
they do agree they will take the relative lack of explanation at this point 
to be a disadvantage that is, all things considered, outweighed by the 
advantages of having non-shareable properties.
Regardless of whether or not this marks a genuine pro tanto weakness 
of trope theory, theistic conferralism allows for a deeper explanation of 
the unity of natural classes of tropes. By accepting the proposed view, 
trope theorists can take a sphericity trope to be a divine act of spherizing. 
And, by accepting Precognition, they can take the natural step of holding 
that the unity of a natural class of modifier tropes is grounded in whatever 
it is that God precognizes when God precognizes the kind of thing that 
he would make were he to perform one of those acts-cum-tropes. Or, 
if you go in for a theory of divine conceptualism, the unity of a natural 
class of tropes would express and be grounded in a single divine idea. 
For example, the natural class of all and only divine spherizings – all the 
sphericity tropes – would enjoy a unity that is grounded in the single 
divine idea of sphericity that all and only those acts-cum-tropes express. 
Thus, any two spherizing acts are spherizing acts in virtue of expressing 
the divine idea of sphericity in general. Solving the unity problem in 
this way requires something like divine conceptualism, but as noted 
32 At issue here is the similarity of simple tropes. A  trope theorist who allows for 
complex tropes (tropes that have tropes as proper parts) can account for the similarity of 
complex tropes in terms of the similarity of their proper parts. Of course, this would not 
account for the similarity of simple tropes.
33 See Campbell (1990: 29-30) for what Ehring (2012: 8f) calls “standard trope theory”.
34 Ehring (2012) defends a different view. On his account, a trope is the kind of trope 
it is in virtue of belonging to primitively natural classes.
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above, the latter is compatible with theistic conferralism and, moreover, 
is naturally suggested by Precognition.
The second weakness concerns the origination of tropes. It is plausible 
to think that tropes are contingent beings – especially within a theistic 
framework. But if so, what accounts for their coming to be? Campbell 
puts the problem as follows. On trope theory,
“[e]very real change involves trope replacement – if trope A gives way to 
trope B, where A ≠ B, a change has occurred. If A and B are of different 
kinds, we have qualitative change of the classic type. What was green is 
now red (as apples ripen). ... As trope replacement, one trope disappears 
and its place is taken by a  brand new creation, a  trope that has not 
hitherto existed. The trouble with such a theory is that the whole process 
remains absolutely obscure and magical. Where does the original trope 
go? Where does the replacement come from? How does the new trope 
nudge the old one out of the way? There is no machinery to manage the 
transition.” (1990: 141-142).
As I read him, Campbell is a module trope theorist. However, his worry 
about trope origination also arises on a modifier trope theory. Suppose 
I mold some clay so as to make a ball and, for the sake of argument, 
suppose the ball is perfectly spherical. On trope theory, the sphericity 
of the ball is numerically unique – that is, it is non-identical with the 
sphericity of any other sphere that there might be. Moreover, on modifier 
trope theory, the sphericity of this ball is not itself spherical and so is 
numerically distinct from the sphere that my molding produced via 
efficient causation. Rather, the sphericity of the ball is the formal cause 
of the ball’s being shaped as it is. Nevertheless, on modifier trope theory, 
a sphericity trope did come into existence, just now, as I finished molding 
the clay. Again, the process by which a trope is conjured up is “absolutely 
obscure and magical”. Thus, in a sense that begs for deeper explanation, 
it would seem that the trope came to be out of nothing.35
Theistic conferralism goes some distance towards providing an 
explanation. Here, tropes are identical with basic divine acts. Because 
tropes are basic acts, they originate in God but are not created per se. 
And because acts of sustenance are contingent, tropes are contingent. 
Thus, theistic conferralism provides for both the origination and 
35 Campbell attempts to solve this problem (and others) by taking all genuine tropes 
to be fields. See Moreland (2001: 66-67) for a critique.
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the contingency of tropes. To be sure, this is not to say that such acts 
are wholly unmysterious. However, a  theist is already committed to 
something rather mysterious: basic divine actions that are contingent 
but non-created. Thus, by identifying some of those basic divine acts 
with tropes, theists consolidate the mystery of trope origination into 
a mystery they already accept. On theistic conferralism, the origination 
of tropes is no more (or less) mysterious than the origination of other 
types of contingent divine acts.
A  third and final problem concerns the indeterminacy of modifier 
tropes. This concern is specific to modifier trope theory. The problem is 
brought to light by the modifier/module distinction, which suggests that 
the concept of a modifier trope is a functional concept. That is, a modifier 
trope is defined in terms of what it does, in terms of its characterizing 
effects, as it were. A sphericity trope, for example, is a sphere-maker; it 
is something that spherizes something else. However, identifying the role 
a modifier trope plays – saying what it does – is insufficient to specify 
the intrinsic nature of the entity that plays that role. Thus, because the 
concept of a modifier trope is a functional concept, merely postulating 
modifier tropes is not enough to fix the trope ontology. Other than 
what they do, what can we say about the modifier tropes themselves? 
Leaving this question unanswered saddles modifier trope theory with 
an undesirable and arguably problematic indeterminacy.36
Theistic conferralism resolves this indeterminacy by identifying 
modifier tropes with divine acts of property-conferral, which, arguably, 
a  theist is already committed to. (And even if theism does not entail 
property-conferral, theism is consistent with it.) These acts play the 
modifier trope role and thus provide a more determinate ontology for 
modifier trope theory.
We have now seen three ways in which theistic conferralism shores up 
weaknesses of modifier trope theory. In addition, theistic conferralism 
seems to be more nominalistic and parsimonious than the conjunction of 
theism and standard trope theory. A theist is independently committed 
to divine actions of some sort or other. Thus, by taking tropes to be 
divine acts, theistic conferralism makes it unnecessary to postulate 
a further category of sui generis tropes. Instead, the category of trope is 
consolidated into the category of divine action.
36  Edwards (2014: 93) raises a  similar objection to both predicate and concept 
nominalism.
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VIII. IMPROVING THE DOCTRINE OF SUSTENANCE
Theistic conferralism also offers a  way to overcome the previously 
mentioned dilemma that property-conferral seems to pose for a theory 
of sustenance. As previously, the dilemma is that the rejection of 
property-conferral threatens to give rise to deism and the affirmation of 
it threatens to give rise to occasionalism.
Property-conferral threatens occasionalism when it is taken to 
involve efficient causation. So understood, God’s conferring sphericity 
on an object would involve God’s being the efficient cause of the object’s 
coming to be spherical. More generally, God would be the efficient cause 
of every creature’s having the character it does. Thus, divine acts of 
property-conferral would be in direct competition with natural causes. 
On such a picture, the threat of occasionalism is severe.
On theistic conferralism, however, divine acts of property-conferral 
do not compete with natural causes. To see this, set aside theistic 
conferralism and consider how character-grounding would otherwise 
work on modifier trope theory.37 To illustrate, suppose L is a  lump of 
clay that an artist shapes into a perfect sphere. L thereby comes to have 
a  sphericity trope and the trope grounds L’s shape. Importantly, the 
efficient cause (the artist) of L’s coming to be spherical acts logically 
(but not temporally) prior to the formal cause (the sphericity trope) of 
L’s being spherical. In this way, on modifier trope theory, a  sphericity 
trope is not an efficient cause. Rather, the trope acts logically posterior to 
efficient causes and does not compete with efficient causes.
According to theistic conferralism, modifier tropes are identical with 
divine actions. As such, divine acts play the character-grounding role that 
standard modifier tropes would otherwise play. That is, divine acts cum 
tropes are formal (non-efficient) causes that operate logically posterior 
to efficient causes and do not compete with efficient causes. Thus, theistic 
conferralism offers a way for sustenance to involve property-conferral 
without putting acts of property-conferral in direct competition with 
natural causes – thereby avoiding occasionalism, while maintaining that 
a  creature’s having a property or power is immediately dependent on 
an unmediated act of divine sustenance – thereby avoiding deism.
37 This is more or less the same way character-grounding works if character-grounders 
are taken to be non-self-exemplifying universals. I  take Armstrong (1980) and (1989) 
and Moreland (2001) to hold the latter view.
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It should be noted, however, that theistic conferralism requires 
rejecting McCann’s thesis that “to sustain an  entity is the same thing 
as to create it” (2012, 29). On theistic conferralism, sustenance is not 
continuous creation because unlike creating, sustaining does not involve 
efficient causation. In other words, with respect to creating something, 
the divine acts that constitute property-conferral include acts that are 
formal causes and acts that are efficient causes. But with respect to 
sustaining something, the acts that constitute property-conferral only 
include acts that are formal causes.
IX. GOING FORWARD
My aim has been to explain and motivate theistic conferralism, the thesis 
that creaturely properties are identical with acts that constitute divine 
sustenance. I have argued that the thesis is attractive because it connects 
so-called trope theory and the doctrine of sustenance in a  mutually 
enhancing way. On the one hand, by identifying tropes with divine 
actions, theistic conferralism mitigates the weaknesses of modifier trope 
theory. And, on the other hand, by identifying divine actions with tropes, 
theistic conferralism offers an understanding of divine sustenance that 
avoids both deism and occasionalism.
Going forward, theistic conferralism raises many questions that 
cannot be taken up here. Most generally, it remains to be seen how best 
to situate the thesis within a complete theistic metaphysic. Perhaps I may 
be permitted to conclude by offering a provisional reply to two specific 
questions.
First, what is the ontological status of the entity that is characterized 
by a modifier trope cum divine act? That is, how should we understand 
trope-bearers on theistic conferralism? For example, what sort of entity 
is the subject of a divine act of (formal) spherizing? Many trope theorists 
are bundle theorists: they take objects to be entirely constructed out of 
tropes.38 On such a view, the bundle that contains a trope is the bearer of 
that trope. Elsewhere I argue that while a module trope bundle theory 
is viable, a modifier trope bundle theory is not.39 Thus, because theistic 
38 Trope bundle theorists include Williams (1953), Campbell (1990), Schaffer (2001), 
Maurin (2002), and Ehring (2011).
39 See my “Tropes as Character-Grounders”. For criticism of bundle theory in general, 
see Garcia (2014b) and (2014c).
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conferralism is predicated on modifier tropes, I take it to be incompatible 
with bundle theory. Presumably, then, if theistic conferralism is to work, 
it will have to work with a substance-attribute model.40 For example, one 
might deploy the thesis within a  substance-attribute model on which 
modifier tropes (here identified with divine acts) and bare particulars 
go together to make up objects. Following other constituent ontologies, 
such as Armstrong (1997) and Moreland (2001), this model could take 
objects to be charactered in virtue of having substrata and modifier 
tropes (divine acts) as constituents, in some (perhaps sui generis and 
non-mereological) sense of ‘constituent’.41
Second, how well does theistic conferralism comport with traditional 
views about divine immutability and divine simplicity? Would 
an unmediated act of property conferral – God’s spherizing a particular, 
say – involve an intrinsic change in God or require God to have constituent 
parts? According to theistic conferralism, by performing acts of property 
conferral, God is in some sense responsive to creaturely reality. But I see 
no reason to think that this kind of divine activity and responsiveness 
is any more (or less) problematic than the more familiar kind of divine 
activity and responsiveness, such as God’s answering prayers or talking 
to Abraham. In short, theistic conferralism does not appear to introduce 
any new kind of challenge for the doctrines of immutability or simplicity.42
40 Trope theorists who reject bundle theory and opt for a substance-attribute model 
include Martin (1980), LaBossiere (1994), Lowe (2006), and Heil (2012).
41 See Magalhães (2006) for a helpful discussion of the sense(s) in which Armstrong’s 
universals are (or are not) spatio-temporal. See Garcia (2014a) and Pickavance (2014) for 
recent discussion of bare particulars.
42 For stimulating discussion of these matters, I wish to thank William Abraham, 
Scott Austin, José Tomás Alvarado, Paul Audi, Andrew Bailey, Tony Bolos, Greg Boyd, 
Jerry Cederblom, John Churchill, Lindsay Cleveland, Richard Cross, Brian Cutter, 
Michael Della Rocca, Laura Ekstrom, Evan Fales, Tobias Flattery, John Forcey, Guido 
Imaguire, Marcin Iwanicki, Christoph Jäger, Nate King, Jon Kvanvig, Hugh McCann, 
William Melanson, Chris Menzel, Christia Mercer, Andrew Newman, Tim Pawl, Tim 
Pickavance, Alex Pruss, Maysam Qasemi, Josh Rasmussen, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, 
Marleen Rozemond, Noël Saenz, Derek Shiller, Jeff Snapper, Helen Steward, Kevin 
Timpe, Zita Toth, Tom Tracy, Chris Tweedt, and Ezequiel Zerbudis, as well as audiences 
at Yale Divinity School, Talbot School of Theology, Houston Baptist University, the 
University of Nebraska at Omaha, the 2013 Philosophy of Religion Conference at Baylor 
University, the 2014 Divine Action in the World Conference in Innsbruck, and the 2014 
Cuarto Coloquio de Metafísica Analítica (Fourth Symposium of Analytical Metaphysics) 
in Santiago, Chile. For discussion and comments on earlier drafts, I am indebted to two 
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